Valkarie at Dealy Plaza and the Smoking JCS J3 Records

The new movie Valkyrie takes its name from the code word for the Nazi general's plot to assassinate Hitler, which resulted in the July 20, 1944 bombing at the Wolf's Lair bunker.

After interviewing Volkmar Schmidt, who met and talked with the accused assassin of President Kennedy about assassinating Hitler and General Walker shortly before he purchased the weapons, I began to research the details of the plot against Hitler and was struck by the similarities between the botched 1944 plot and the Kennedy assassination.

I wrote an article about how four of those individuals directly involved in the plot to kill Hitler were also entwined with the events at Dealey Plaza.

Besides a number of characters being involved in both plots, I noticed that one key attribute of the Valkarie operation was adapted at Dealey Plaza - getting the targeted victim to approve the operation that lead directly to his death, a vital aspect of the operation that takes it from a murder to a coup.

In Phil Villarreal's review of the movie Valkarie, he notes, "There is a certain satisfaction in watching the plot come together. Amazingly it was actually Hitler who signed off on his own potential death warrant by authorizing changes in a contingency plan that set reserve troops into action to suppress a government takeover. Von Stauffenberg and his confederates wanted to use the troops to stifle the SS after Hitler's death."

In the assassination of President Kennedy we find that covert anti-Castro Cuban operations, approved by JFK, and intentionally exposed to RFK, were utilized in the assassination of President Kennedy, thus blackballing RFK from retaliation after the death of JFK.

Looking closely at the specific CIA authorized attacks against Castro that were connected directly to what happened at Dealey Plaza I came up with the June, 1963 Bayo-Pawly raid and the Halloween night attack by the raider mother ship Rex. [See: JFK Assassinaiton - The Administrative Details ]

On April Fool's Day, April 1, 1963, those responsible for covert operations against Cuba, the Cuban Coordinating Committee, suggested a number of specific plans to be directed against Castro, some of which were later approved by the President.
Some of these specific operations approved by the President, which involved maritime attacks against Cuba from Florida (Bayo/Pawley-Operation Red Cross/the Rex), included agents and operatives who later became entwined in the events of that took place in Dallas.

Lamar Waldron argues that the Mafia dons redirected the plan for a coup in Cuba to kill JFK
, while Gus Russo contends that Oswald acted on behalf of Cubans who retaliated in response to the JFK/RFK plots to kill Castro.

While I noticed the similarities between the Valkarie and Dealey Plaza and wrote about them, Gus Russo provides the proof of the plot and shows us where to find it.

Gus Russo (in The Nation and Brothers In Arms) lays out the story of the (March 1962) Hemingway plot against Castro, and quotes a number of former CIA officers who claim both JFK and RFK approved operations to kill Castro, every one of them on the CCC and in the room in April 1963 when the specific covert ops against Castro were approved Califano, Haig, Halpern et al.

Knowing there was something going on between Valkarie and Dealey Plaza, I was still taken aback when I read the following passage in Gus Russo's new book Brothers In Arms. (p. 294)

"...But the (Cubala/AM/LASH) plot hurtled forward in hopes of success before the 1964 elections in the U.S. Joseph Califano, of the Pentagon's Cuban Coordinating Committee, was being pressed by Des FitzGerald for all the Defense Department intel he could get on the key Cuban military officers, scoping for a 'mole' within the regime. 52 FitzGerald was about to brief the Joint Chiefs and, although Califano was excluded from the meeting on September 25, Des and the Agency were, according to memos later released, studying how German generals had plotted to kill Hitler, in order to develop a way to organize high-ranking Cuban officers to kill Castro. 53.

Indeed!, not only were there common characters and similar attributes between the Valkarie plot and what happened at Dealey Plaza, the very office (Cuban Coordinating Committee CCC-OSACSA) I had previously identified were actively "studying how German generals had plotted to kill Hitler."

Russo's notes tell us the proof that they utilized the German general's plans against Hiter can be found in a Joint Chiefs of Staff document J3 #29 (with the Record Identification File (RIF# ) 202-10001-10028), which Rex Bradford over at the Mary Ferrell Archives has conviently posted on line. (Thanks Rex).

It is dated September 25, 1963, the day the accused assassin left New Orleans for Mexico City, and there's a lot more interesting names and items in this memo than just the fact that they were studying the Valkarie plot to use against Castro.

Russo Notes:
#52. Califano. p. 124.
#53. Califano citing: JCS Memo for the Record, Walter Higgins, "Brifing by Mr. Desmond FitzGerald on CIA Cuban Operations and Planning," JFK Collection, JCS Papers, J-3, #29, 202-10001-10028, NARA.;relPageId=5


25 September 1963


Subject: Briefing by Mr. Desmond FitzGerald on
CIA Cuban Operations and Planning

  • 1. At the JCS meeting at 1400 on 25 September, Mr. Desmond FitzGerald briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  • 2. Except for General Taylor and Admiral McDonald, the Joint Chiefs were present, as were the Directors and Secretariat. Colonel Higgins from SACSA was the only other officer in attendance.
  • 3. General LeMay opened the meeting by referring to papers recently discussed by the Joint Chiefs on policy and actions concerning military support of the CIA for operations against Cuba. General LeMay expressed the JCS position as had been reflected in the memoranda to Mr. Vance which in effect is that the Joint Chiefs do not believe that the operations to date are of a size and importance enough to justify the use of military support for protection.
  • 4. Mr. FitzGerald then discussed his personal feelings as to changed conditions in Cuba. Essentially, he believes that Castro's hold in Cuba has been seriously weakened since last July. He believes that the minor raids conducted by the CIA have contributed to this deterioration in Castro's influence and stability. He is firmly convinced that Castro will fall at some future, not too distant, date, and that such actions as the CIA are conducting, as well as those of exiles, are contributing to unrest and unsettlement.
  • 5. Mr. FitzGerald, in commenting upon criteria as to when the military support should be provided, offered the following. The greatest danger from his point of view is that the mother ships may be captured rather than be sunk. This will result in the capture of crewmen who have too much information and which could result in dangerous publicity for the United States. The location of these raids contributes to the possibility of capture. Hence, only when the raids are conducted in the more vulnerable areas from that point of view, is it likely that the CIA will request military support. He further stated that CIA has no intention of requesting aid for the coming raid.
  • 6. General LeMay questioned the danger of capture in view of the capabilities of Cubans and ridiculed the idea that small motor boats should have the capability of such a ship.
  • 7. General LeMay and others gave opinions concerning such technicalities as the capability of radar both on land and in the air, capability of ship radar of the U.S. and Cuba, the speed of the mother ship, which was cited as 10 to 12 knots, and other related items.
  • 8. Mr. FitzGerald made much of the Cuban volatile nature. He cited that many Cubans are now walking with their heads up and alert because of the realization that there are possibilities of raids and other outside supports, such as the light aircraft raids. He voiced the opinion that Castro would probably take desperate measures as his situation further deteriorates and would turn to creating revolutions in Latin America. He stated that even though his operations may be considered only minor, he thought they were doing about as much as could be done under the present policies. One of his problems was that he felt there was only a total of 50 logical targets and if he conducted as many as 10 raids a month, he would be unable to sustain the build-up of Cuban hopes. He further stated that there were times when certain types of raids were more favorable than others; for instance, on sugar centrals.
  • 9. In responding to the question concerning the non-attributality of U.S. equipment, he stated that all equipment they use could be bought on the open market in many countries, even though it was of American origin. He stated that intelligence was not as good yet as they would like to have; however, they are having greater success in having agents enter and depart Cuba.
  • 10. General Wheeler injected that he sympathizes with such planners as Mr. FitzGerald because he realizes that many good ideas are never accepted by the cautious policy makers. However, Mr. FitzGerald reported that he believes he had a clearer go-ahead on these operations than he has ever had in his past experience.
  • 11. Mr. FitzGerald said that over the next two or three months his plans include critical targets of three classes: electrical systems, sugar centrals, and oil. He cited that electrical systems, although a top priority and a key to the economy, were very difficult targets. The sugar centrals were only of a seasonal nature because unless hit at the peak season, they could be repaired without difficulty or loss of time. In regard to oil, the refineries are most important but were also toughest to hit.
  • 12. In response to a comment by General Shoup regarding the sabotage of mines Mr. FitzGerald said there had been a recent case of internal sabotage in a mine. He then explained how the success of his operations can only be measured when internal sabotage is increased. In response to a question, he admitted that there was not any coordination as yet with the internal sabotage program.
  • 13. He commented that there was nothing new in the propaganda field. However, he felt that there had been great success in getting closer to the military personnel who might break with Castro, and stated that there were at least ten high-level military personnel who are talking with CIA but as yet are not talking to each other, since that degree of confidence has not yet developed. He considers it as a parallel in history; i.e., the plot to kill Hitler; and this plot is being studied in detail to develop an approach.
  • 14. General LeMay then questioned the advisability of utilizing a communication technique to install a radio capability which would permit break-in on Castro broadcasts. He stated that an Air Force officer named McElroy was available to talk to Mr. FitzGerald on the matter, and Mr. FitzGerald accepted this offer.
  • 15. The conference closed with General LeMay directing that Mr. FitzGerald's planners meet with General Krulak's people and work out the details as to how the military can assist in supporting these operations. After Mr. FitzGerald departed, General LeMay gave added directions to Colonel Higgins to initiate necessary steps for planning.
  • 16. After the JCS meeting Admiral Riley called Colonel Higgins into his office and read a letter from Mr. McGeorge Bundy which discussed secrecy measures necessary related to Cuba CIA operations. Admiral Riley directed Colonel Higgins to have the nature of this letter put out through SACSA control to SACSA contact points to insure an adequate system for secrecy within the military services. Admiral Riley stated he was returning the letter to Mr. Gilpatric as he did not want written communication by SACSA, but to put this out orally. This was transmitted to Colonel Wyman who will take the action to prepare an appropriate memorandum for the record to be filed with General Ingelido in accordance with further direction by Admiral Riley.
  • 17. General Wheeler, Chief of Staff of the Army, called and questioned us concerning SACSA's access for the knowledge of such operations as mentioned in the McGeorge Bundy letter. I advised him that our Pendulum system was in being but that I would look into it in greater detail to determine that it met the letter as well as the spirit of the memorandum. I stated I believed this was so but had not had reason to do it until this date and therefore did not give him a positive answer at that time.

  • Colonel, USA

    Does anybody else find this interesting?